In 1934, in Bernays' preface to the first edition of the first volume of Hilbert and Bernays' monograph "Grundlagen der Mathematik", a nearly completed draft of the the finally two-volume monograph is mentioned, which had to be revoked because of the completely changed situation in the area of proof theory after Herbrand and Gödel's revolutionary results. Nothing at all seems to be known about this draft and its whereabouts.
Introduction

Hilbert-Bernays in general
By the 1930s, ground-breaking work had been achieved by German scientists, especially in philosophy, psychology, physics, chemistry, and mathematics. With the Nazis' seizure of power in 1933, the historical tradition of German research was discontinued in most areas, and, as a further consequence, many achievements of German science in the first half of the 20 th century have still not been sufficiently recognized. This is the case especially for those developments that had not been completed before the Nazis covered Germany under twelve years of intellectual darkness.
David Hilbert (1862 Hilbert ( -1943 ) is one of the most outstanding representatives of mathematics, mathematical physics, and logic-oriented foundational sciences in general [ Reid, 1970 ] . From the end of the 19 th century to the erosion of the University of Göttingen by the Nazis, Hilbert formed and reshaped many areas of applied and pure mathematics. Most wellknown and highly acknowledged are his "Foundations of Geometry" [ Hilbert, 1899 ] .
After initial work at the very beginning of the 20 th century, Hilbert re-intensified his research into the logical foundations of mathematics in 1917, together with his new assistant Paul Bernays (1888 Bernays ( -1977 . Supported by their PhD student Wilhelm Ackermann , Bernays and Hilbert developed the field of proof theory (or metamathematics), where formalized mathematical proofs become themselves the objects of mathematical operations and investigations -just as numbers are the objects of number theory. The goal of Hilbert's endeavors in this field was to prove the consistency of the customary methods in mathematics once and for all, without the loss of essential theorems as in the competing intuitionist movements of Kronecker, Brouwer, Weyl, and Heyting. The proof of the consistency of mathematics was to be achieved by subdivision into the following three tasks:
• Arithmetization of mathematics.
• Logical formalization of arithmetic.
• Consistency proof in the form of a proof of impossibility: It cannot occur in arithmetic that there are formal derivations of a formula A and also of its negation A.
The problematic step in this program (nowadays called Hilbert's program) is the consistency proof.
Hilbert's program was nourished by the hope that mathematics -as the foundation of natural sciences, and especially of modern physics -could thus provide the proof of its own groundedness. This was a paramount task of the time, not least because of the foundational crisis in mathematics (which had been evoked among others by Russell's Paradox at the beginning of the 20 th century) and the vivid philosophic discussions of the formal sciences stimulated inter alia by Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle.
Cf. e.g. [Wittgenstein, 1994] , [Waismann, 1967] .
It should be recognized that Hilbert's primary goal was neither a reduction of mathematical reasoning and writing to formal logic as in the seminal work of Whitehead & Russell [ 1910 , nor a formalization of larger parts of mathematics as in the publications of the famous French Bourbaki [ 1939ff. ] group of mathematicians. His ambition was to secure -once and for all -the foundation of mathematics with consistency proofs, in which an intuitively consistent, "finitist" part of mathematics was to be used for showing that no contradiction could be formally derived in larger and larger parts of non-constructive and axiomatic mathematics.
Hilbert's program fascinated an elite of young outstanding mathematicians, among them John von Neumann (1903 Neumann ( -1957 , Kurt Gödel (1906 -1978 , Jacques Herbrand (1908 Herbrand ( -1931 , and Gerhard Gentzen (1909 Gentzen ( -1945 , whose contributions essentially shaped the fields of modern mathematical logic and proof theory.
We know today that Hilbert's quest to establish a foundation for the whole scientific edifice could not be successful to the proposed extent: Gödel's incompleteness theorems dashed the broader hopes of Hilbert's program. Without the emphasis that Hilbert has put on the foundational issues, however, our negative and positive knowledge on the possibility of a logical grounding of mathematics (and thus of all exact sciences) would hardly have been achieved at his time.
Drafts for Hilbert-Bernays
The central and most involved presentation of Hilbert's program and Hilbert's proof theory is found in the two-volume monograph "Grundlagen der Mathematik" of 1939 ] , and its second revised edition .
We should not forget the historical context of the original writing of these texts in the late 1920s and the 1930s: First, Herbrand's Fundamental Theorem and Gödel's incompleteness theorems hit the new field of proof theory like a hurricane. Moreover, after the Nazi takeover of Germany in January 1933, Bernays was expelled from his academic position in Göttingen in April 1933, and had to leave the country. As a consequence, both volumes show strong signs of reorganization and rewriting, sometimes even the signs of hurry to meet the publication deadlines.
Because of this editorial and historical context, the drafts for both editions of the two Hilbert-Bernays volumes are of special interest, in particular the drafts that did not find their way into any of the editions.
Until recently, however, we did not know anything substantial about these revoked drafts for Hilbert-Bernays. In May 2017, however, we identified a displaced text in Bernays' scientific legacy in the archive of the ETH Zurich as a candidate for such a revoked draft. We will describe and investigate this text in this paper, and discuss at what time it was probably written, and by whom, &c.
There are two infamous revoked drafts for Hilbert-Bernays of which Bernays stated that they at least had existed -one for the first and one for the second edition:
The Mentioning of the Draft for the First Edition
Bernays' "Vorwort zur ersten Auflage" ("Preface to the First Edition") of [ Hilbert & Bernays, 1934, p.VII f. ] , begins as follows:
"Eine Darstellung der Beweistheorie, welche aus dem Hilbertschen Ansatz zur Behandlung der mathematisch-logischen Grundlagenprobleme erwachsen ist, wurde schon seit längerem von Hilbert angekündigt.
Die Ausführung dieses Vorhabens hat eine wesentliche Verzögerung dadurch erfahren, daß in einem Stadium, in dem die Darstellung schon ihrem Abschluß nahe war, durch das Erscheinen der Arbeiten von Herbrand und Gödel eine veränderte Situation im Gebiet der Beweistheorie entstand, welche die Berück-sichtigung neuer Einsichten | zur Aufgabe machte. Dabei ist der Umfang des Buches angewachsen, so daß eine Teilung in zwei Bände angezeigt erschien."
In the translation of (comments omitted):
"Some time ago, Hilbert announced a presentation of the proof theory that developed from the Hilbertian approach to the problems in the foundations of mathematics and logic.
The execution of this enterprise received considerable delay because the whole field of proof theory was changed by the publication of the works of Herbrand and Gödel when our work was already close to completion; and this change put the consideration of new insights | onto the agenda. As a consequence of this, the size of the book grew to the extent that a separation into two volumes seemed appropriate.
Nothing about this work "already close to completion" and its whereabouts seems to be known.
The Mentioning of the Given-Up Work on the Second Edition
Bernays' "Vorwort zur zweiten Auflage" ("Preface to the Second Edition") of [ Hilbert & Bernays, 1934, p .V ] begins as follows:
"Schon vor etlichen Jahren haben der verstorbene Heinrich Scholz und Herr F. K. Schmidt mir vorgeschlagen, eine zweite Auflage der "Grundlagen der Mathematik" vorzunehmen, und Herr G. Hasenjaeger war auch zu meiner Unterstützung bei dieser Arbeit auf einige Zeit nach Zürich gekommen. Es zeigte sich jedoch bereits damals, daß eine Einarbeitung der vielen im Gebiet der Beweistheorie hinzugekommenen Ergebnisse eine völlige Umgestaltung des Buches erfordert hätte."
In the translation of : "A number of years ago, the late Heinrich Scholz and Mr. F. K. Schmidt suggested the undertaking of a second edition of the "Foundations of Mathematics"; and moreover, to assist me in this work, Mr. G. Hasenjaeger came to Zürich for some time. Already back then, it became obvious that the integration of the many new results in the area of proof theory would have required a complete reorganization of the book."
We will document when Hasenjaeger came to Zürich for this purpose, but we still do not know about the whereabouts of main document of the work done during this time.
2 The Typescript 2.1 Form, Locality, and Displacement of the Typescript
The unpublished typescript we will discuss here is an untitled typescript with corrections by Bernays' hand. Two carbon copies of this typescript 2 were found in a part of the legacy of Gisbert Hasenjaeger that is currently still with his daughter Beate Becker.
The typescript has 34 pages, with page numbers 2-34 on the page heads. One of the two carbon copies comes with two additional pages containing the footnotes for the typescript, again corrected by Bernays' hand.
Bernays, however, neither had a typewriter, nor is he known to have ever used one [ Bernays, 2017 ] . The spelling is German-Austrian and the typescript includes the "ß", not found on typewriters with Swiss layout. We did not manage to find significant differences between the typewriter fonts of the typescript and of the footnotes. The folders where the typescript was found are listed on p. 7 of [ Bernays, 1986 ] Both of these copies come without the corrections by Bernays' hand, but the one of them has most of these corrections added (mostly with a typewriter), and the other includes the typewriting of even more of the corrections by Bernays' hand. The introductory section of the typescript has the main headline "Einleitung" and the subsection headline " § 1. Einführung in die Fragestellung".
The text then starts literally with the first paragraph of § 1 of (p. 1), including the enumerated list of three items. The next paragraph of , namely the one the "verschärften methodischen Anforderungen" resulting in "eine neue Art der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Problem des Unendlichen", is not present in the typescript, but then the text continues almost literally with the penultimate paragraph and the first sentence of the last paragraph of p. 1 of . The part on the "axiomatische existentiale Form", however, is again missing in the typescript.
After a rather insignificant text, what follows then is almost literally the text from the 2 nd paragraph starting on p. 2 of up to the end of the 2 nd paragraph starting on p. 3, where only the last part of the last sentence "als gültig vorausgesetzt, und wir kommen so zu der Frage, welcher Art diese Geltung ist." is missing in the typescript, where the sentence ends with "zugrundegelegt." instead.
A completely new introduction; from the typescript, pp. 5-14
Then, however, comes the following most interesting and well-written introduction to the foundations of mathematics and Hilbert's proof theory that seems to be entirely unpublished. This introduction reads as follows:
"Wir kommen somit zu dem zweiten der anfangs genannten Themata der Grundlagenuntersuchungen. In der Begründung der Analysis ist es ja im 19. Jahrhundert zuerst durch die Untersuchungen von Bolzano und Cauchy und hernach deren Weiterführung und Vollendung durch Dedekind, Cantor und Weierstrasz gelungen, Indem diese Deutlichkeit erreicht wurde, traten zugleich die zugrundeliegenden methodischen Voraussetzungen mehr hervor, und man ging auch dazu über, diese Voraussetzungen über die Zielsetzung der Infinitesimalrechnung hinaus systematisch zu verwerten, wie es ja vor allem in der Cantor'schen Mengenlehre geschah. Die hier stattfindende starke Über-schreitung des mathematisch Gewohnten weckte vielerseits Kritik, die dann noch durch die Entdeckung der mengentheoretischen Paradoxien bestärkt wurde.
Wenngleich es sich nun auch bei näherem Zusehen erwies, daß es zur Verhütung der Paradoxien genügte, gewisse extreme Begriffsbildungen zu vermeiden, die tatsächlich für den Aufbau der Mengenlehre und erst recht für die Methoden der Analysis gar nicht erforderlich sind, so ist doch seitdem die Diskussion über die Grundlagen der Mathematik nicht zur Ruhe gekommen, und man hat sich auch jener Paradoxien als Argument bedient, um viel weiter gehende Einschränkungen des mathematischen Verfahrens zu motivieren, als sie zur Behebung der Widersprüche | direkt erfordert werden.
Für eine gründliche Stellungnahme zu dieser Grundlagendiskussion scheint eine eingehende Betrachtung der logischen Struktur der mathematischen Theorien als geboten.
In der Tat bemerkt man, daß es sich bei den zur Diskussion stehenden Verfahren der Mathematik um Methoden des Folgerns und der Begriffsbildung handelt, daß also hier eine Art der Erweiterung der gewöhnlichen Logik zur Geltung kommt. Zugleich zeigt sich eine enge Verflochtenheit des Mathematischen mit dem Logischen: einerseits tritt die Mengenlehre ihrem Gegenstand nach, durch die Beziehung von Mengen und Prädikaten (d. h. durch das Verhältnis von Umfang und Inhalt der Begriffe) in engste Berührung mit der Logik; andererseits wird man in der systematischen Untersuchung der logischen Bildungsformen und Schlußweisen mit Notwendigkeit auf mathematische Betrachtungen geführt. So ist ja bereits die traditionelle Lehre von den kategorischen Schlüssen eine typisch mathematische Untersuchung, was nur durch ihre historische Einordnung in die Philosophie leicht verdeckt wird. Mit dieser mathematischen Seite des Logischen hängt es auch zusammen, daß die logischen Schlüsse -wie sie insbesondere bei der reichhaltigeren Anwendung der Logik in den mathematischen Theorien zur Verwendung kommen -, in einer mathematischen Weise fixierbar und aus einer Reihe von wenigen Elementarprozessen zusammensetzbar sind.
Dieser Sachverhalt wurde zur vollen Deutlichkeit gebracht | durch die Entwicklung der Systeme der symbolischen Logik, wie sie, vorbereitet durch den Boole'schen Logikkalkul, um die Jahrhundertwende insbesondere von Peirce, Frege, Schröder, Peano, Whitehead u. Russell geschaffen wurden. Bei der Konstruktion dieser Systeme ging man teils darauf aus, eine handliche Symbolik zu gewinnen, die zugleich eine genauere Kontrolle der Schlußfolgerungen ermöglichte, teils bezweckte man eine Einordnung der Mathematik in die Logik.
Es war der Gedanke Hilberts, die logische Symbolik dazu zu verwerten, die mathematischen Beweismethoden zum Gegenstand einer mathematischen Untersuchung, einer "Beweistheorie", zu machen.
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Der wesentliche Gesichtspunkt dabei ist, die Methode der formalen Axiomatik auch auf das logische Schließen selbst, wie es in den Theorien der Der erste Ansatz in dieser Richtung war der Hilbert'sche Heidelberger Vortrag [von] 1904 [Hilbert, 1905] [Gödel, 1931] 
Eine präzise Vergleichung ist darum hier nicht zu verlangen, weil die intuitionistische Haltung nicht durch Gebrauchsregeln, sondern durch eine philosophische Einstellung charakterisiert ist. Das wird auch von Heyting ungeachtet der von ihm durchgeführten Formalisierung der intuitionistischen Logik und Mathematik hervorgehoben. Für eine Konfrontierung der Methoden der konstruktiven Beweistheorie mit denen des Intuitionismus sind auch die neueren Untersuchungen von G. F. C. Griss über die negationsfreie intuitionistische Mathematik von Belang, bei welchen das Operieren mit irrealen (unerfüllten) Annahmen grundsätzlich vermieden wird (Proc. Kon. Ned. Adad. v. Wetensch. 49 (1946) [Griss, 1946] , 53 (1950) [Griss, 1950 [Griss, ] und 54 (1951 [Griss, 1951a; [)].
| Unter den weitergehenden Fragestellungen sind nun auch etliche solche, bei denen die Verbindlichkeit der Anforderung einer methodischen Beschränkung als fraglich erscheint. So sind in neuerer Zeit verschiedene/ n erfolgreiche Untersuchungen, die in weiterem Sinne zum Felde der Beweistheorie gehören, im Rahmen der üblichen mathematischen Methodik, also ohne Beschränkung der Begriffsbildungen und Beweismethoden, durchgeführt worden. Andererseits haben verschiedene Autoren für jene speziellen beweistheoretischen Untersuchungen, die es mit den Fragen der Widerspruchsfreiheit zu tun haben, einen solchen Standpunkt gewählt, bei welchem von den drei vorhin formulierten Forderungen nur die erste zugrunde gelegt wird.
Eine endgültige Entscheidung der Methodenfrage kann dieser Sachlage gegenüber jedenfalls nur erwartet werden, wenn man einen Überblick darüber hat, was die verschiedenen Methoden zu leisten vermögen. Es kann schwerlich behauptet werden, daß gegenwärtig eine Entscheidung jener Frage vorliegt, die nicht bloß durch eine vorgefaßte philosophische Ansicht bestimmt ist. Und bezüglich der verschiedenen sich bekämpfenden und heute üblichermaßen gegenübergestellten philosophischen Lehrmeinungen besteht der Verdacht, daß sie ungeklärte Voraussetzungen in sich schließen, die ihrerseits vielleicht eher fragwürdig sind als die angefochtenen mathematischen Theorien.
Angesichts dieser Sachlage erscheint es als das angemessene Verfahren, daß wir einerseits die methodische Richtlinie, die durch den Gesichtspunkt der finiten Betrachtung gegeben wird, im Auge behalten, andererseits uns nicht in der Methode festlegen. Dabei ist insbesondere der Umstand mitbestimmend, daß neuerdings die beweistheoretischen Untersuchungen in einen engeren Kontakt getreten sind mit den allgemeinen Theorien der abstrakten Algebra und Topologie, 9 | so daß die Aussicht sich eröffnet, daß die beweistheoretischen Methoden zu einem wirkungsvollen Hilfsmittel in diesen Gebieten sich entwickeln. Bei solchen Anwendungen fungiert die Beweistheorie nicht in der Rolle der Beweiskritik, sondern im Rahmen der üblichen Methoden des mathematischen Schließens, und es würde darum hier die Forderung der finiten Betrachtungsweise gar nicht am Platze sein. -Zur Vorbereitung unserer beweistheoretischen Betrachtungen ist es nun auf jeden Fall wünschenswert, daß die spezifische Art der finiten Überlegung deutlich gemacht werde. Zur Illustrierung eignet sich besonders das Gebiet der elementaren Zahlentheorie, in welcher der Standpunkt der direkten inhaltlichen, ohne axiomatische Annahmen sich vollziehenden Überlegungen am reinsten ausgebildet ist." § 2 of the typescript is entitled "Die elementare Zahlentheorie" ("Elementary Number Theory") and contains a version similar to pp. 20-28 of , i.e. the first nine pages of § 2, which is entitled: "Die elementare Zahlentheorie. -Das finite Schließen und seine Grenzen."
("Elementary Number Theory. -Finitist Inference and its Limits")
The first five paragraphs of § 2 of , however, are missing in the typescript. For the first paragraph this is no wonder because it is again on the subject of the first two paragraphs missing at the beginning of § 1 (cf. our § 2.3.1). The further four paragraphs missing in the typescript contain a digression on geometry.
A sentence following the second edition instead of the first one
A significant difference to is that -instead of the paragraph "Diese Figuren bilden eine Art von Ziffern; wir wollen hier das Wort '
Ziffer' schlechtweg zur Bezeichnung dieser Figuren gebrauchen." "These figures constitute a kind of numeral; and we will simply use the word 'numeral ' to designate just these figures."
of [ Hilbert & Bernays, 1934, p. 21 ] " -we find in the typescript the following sentence of [ Hilbert & Bernays, 1968, p. 21 ] :
"Wir wollen diese Figuren, mit einer leichten Abweichung vom gewohnten Sprachgebrauch, als ' Ziffern' bezeichen." "Deviating slightly from the common usage of language, we will call these figures 'numerals'."
It is unlikely that this text was just copied from the second edition, however, because the typescript contains the addition "(in Ermangelung eines besseren kurzen Ausdrucks)" ("(lacking a better short expression)"), which is deleted by hand.
A significant improvement compared to both editions
Another significant difference in the typescript is in the enumerated list of five elements that make up the "Zeichen zur Mitteilung" ("symbols for communication"): In item 1 we read "kleine deutsche Buchstaben zur Bezeichnung für unbestimmt gelassene Ziffern;" "small German letters for designating numerals that are left undetermined;" in the typescript, instead of the "Kleine deutsche Buchstaben zur Bezeichnung für irgendeine nicht festgelegte Ziffer"
"Small German letters for designating an arbitrary, not determined numeral;"
found in both editions of the "Grundlagen der Mathematik".
Together with other hints on the finitist standpoint found in the typescript, this correction was crucial for a change in translation in the third edition , as compared to the first two editions where we translated the latter German term -after communication with several members of the advisory board of the HilbertBernays Project, who agreed that the meaning is ambiguous -with the similarly ambiguous term "an arbitrary indeterminate numeral". Our new translation in the third edition is "arbitrary, not determined numerals", which clearly disambiguates these small German letters from variables as well as from arbitrary objects in the sense of Fine [ 1985 ] .
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For a more detailed discussion see Note 21.6 on p. 21.b in the third edition .
2.5 § 3 of the Typescript § 3 is the final section of the typescript.
It is entitled "Überschreitung des finiten Standpunktes im mathematischen Schließen." ("Transgression of the finitist standpoint in mathematical inference."). It is only three pages long (pp. 32-34) and most interesting. Thus, we present it here in total: 2.5.1 From the typescript, pp. 32-34 "Unsere ausgeführte Betrachtung der Anfangsgründe der Zahlentheorie diente dazu, uns das direkte inhaltliche, in Gedankenexperimenten an anschaulich vorgestellten Objekten sich vollziehende und von axiomatischen Annahmen freie Schließen in seiner Anwendung und Handhabung vorzuführen. Wir haben uns dabei an die methodische Einstellung gehalten, die wir anfangs nach Hilbert als den "finiten Standpunkt" bezeichnet haben. Wir wollen nun des näheren betrachten, wie man dazu veranlaßt wird, den finiten Standpunkt zu überschreiten. Dabei wollen wir anknüpfen an die früher gegebene Kennzeichnung des finiten Standpunktes, die ja mittels der drei charakteristischen Momente erfolgte: 1. Beschränkung der Gegenstände auf endliche diskrete Gebilde; 2. Beschränkung der Anwendung der logischen Formen des allgemeinen und des existentialen Urteils im Sinne der Vermeidung der Vorstellung von fertigen unendlichen Gesamtheiten; 3. Beschränkung der Annahmen auf solche über endliche Konfigurationen.
Diese Momente sind geordnet im Sinne einer zunehmenden Anforderung. Wir werden nun bei der Betrachtung der Überschreitung des finiten Standpunktes naturgemäß in entgegengesetzter Reihenfolge, im Sinne einer schrittweisen Abstreifung der Anforderungen, verfahren. |
As long as we were not able to give the German term a unique reading, we had to be careful and use a translation that does not cut off any possibly meaningful reading. It was our typescript here that provided the information for such a unique reading. Now we can translate that reading and do not have to bother our readers with an ambiguous English term.
As long as there are several possible readings, a translator must not give only his favorite interpretation of the original in the translation. If the translator knows exactly what is meant, however, then that meaning should to be captured in the translation as clearly and unambiguously as possible; otherwise the translator would propagate the weed of imperfect expression that always comes with the crop, in particular regarding the fruits of science.
Ein Verstoß gegen die dritte Forderung, wonach alle Annahmen sich auf endliche Konfigurationen beziehen sollen, liegt bereits überall da vor, wo man die Annahme der Gültig-keit eines allgemeinen Satzes über Ziffern einführt.
Eine Veranlassung dazu ist insbesondere gegeben bei Anwendung der vollständigen Induktion zum Beweise von Sätzen, welche eine Beziehung A(m, n) für beliebige Ziffern m, n behaupten. Soll die Induktion, etwa nach n, im finiten Sinne erfolgen, so muß bei dem Schluß von A(m, n) auf A(m, n+1) die Ziffer m festgehalten werden. In dieser Weise sind wir auch im vorigen Paragraphen bei den Beweisen der Rechengesetze für Summe und Produkt verfahren.
Häufig wird aber die vollständige Induktion so angewandt, daß man zunächst zeigt, daß für jede Ziffer m die Beziehung A(m, 1) besteht, und sodann beweist, daß, falls für die Ziffer n bei jeder beliebigen Ziffer m A(m, n) besteht, dann auch bei jeder Ziffer m A(m, n+1) besteht. Man schließt daraus nach der vollständigen Induktion, daß für jede Ziffer n gilt, daß für jede Ziffer m A(m, n+1) besteht.
Hier hat man in der zweiten zu beweisenden Behauptung einen Allsatz als Prämisse; es wird ja angenommen, daß (für den fixierten Wert n) bei jeder Ziffer m die Beziehung A(m, n) bestehe. Dieses Vorausgesetzte können wir uns nicht in der Vorstellung eigentlich vergegenwärtigen.
Freilich läßt sich in vielen Fällen die genannte Form der Anwendung der vollständigen Induktion vom finiten Standpunkt motivieren. A(k 1 , n), . . . , A(k r , n) benutzt wird, worin k 1 , . . . , k r gewisse aus m und n zu ermittelnde Ziffern sind.
In diesem Falle kommt ja der Beweis des hypothetischen Satzes mit der Allprämisse darauf hinaus, daß man zeigt, daß sich die Feststellung der Beziehung A(m, n+1) (für die fixierten Ziffern m, n) zurückführen läßt auf die Feststellung der Beziehungen (1), und damit ist ein Regreß gegeben, der die Feststellung von A(m, n+1) in einer begrenzten Zahl von Schritten auf die Feststellung von Beziehungen A(z 1 , 1), . . . , A(z Ŋ , 1) zurückführt, und für diese wird durch den anfänglichen Beweis des Bestehens von A(m, 1) für beliebige m das allgemeine Verfahren gegeben.
Diese Art der Rechtfertigung der erweiterten Form der vollständigen Induktion mit Allsätzen als Prämissen ist jedoch nicht generell anwendbar. Insbesondere erwächst eine Schwierigkeit aus dem Umstand, daß derartige erweiterte Induktionen in komplizierter Weise ineinandergeschachtelt sein können. Wir wollen einen typischen Fall dieser Art näher betrachten. Es handelt sich dabei um einen konstruktiv behandelbaren Teil der Cantorschen Theorie der transfiniten Ordinalzahlen."
The text suddenly ends here. It is not clear whether the remainder is displaced or whether Bernays further draft (typically in Gabelsberger shorthand) -which must have been written before the introduction to this subsection -was never put into typewriting.
3 Trying to find out the Time of Writing 3.1 § 1 of the Typescript (Hints: Before 1929 Before , 1931 Before , or 1950 Before -1977 3.1.1 Possible explanations for the missing of the two paragraphs on the axiomatic existential form in the introductory part
For explaining why the two paragraphs from the beginning of § 1 of are missing in the typescript (cf. § 2.3.1), we see the following three options:
1. The missing of the two paragraphs may indicate that the typescript was written before 1929 for the following reason: Soon later the subjects of these paragraphs have become an integral part of the standard presentation, which was never dropped in publications; cf. the initial sections of [ Bernays, 1930/31 ] , .
2. It may be that Bernays or the Hilbert school in logic temporarily dropped the idea of the "axiomatische existentiale Form" after the shock of Gödel's incompleteness theorems, say in 1931. This could explain the second dropping (of the paragraph that is explicitly on the "axiomatische existentiale Form"); and the first paragraph missing in the typescript (right from the beginning of § 1 of ) would be dropped then as well.
3. A third option is that the whole text was written by Gisbert Hasenjaeger during his stay as Bernays' assistant in Zürich, or later as a consequence of this stay. What speaks for this option is the overall improved pedagogical quality of the typescript as compared to the corresponding sections in . Then the missing paragraphs could be not actually missing, but just deferred to a later section where they are more appropriate from the pedagogical viewpoint.
The completely new introduction
In the completely new introduction to foundations of mathematics and Hilbert's proof theory (cf. § 2.3.2), there are some references to relevant published work that may help to date the typescript.
1. There is the following reference (cf. Note 5, § 2.3.2):
"Tatsächlich hat es sich im Fall der Beweistheorie herausgestellt, daß für die gewünschten Nachweise der Widerspruchsfreiheit formalisierter Theorien die finiten Methoden nicht zulänglich sind." "For the case of proof theory, as a matter of fact, it has turned out that the finitist methods are not sufficient for the desired proofs of the consistency of formalized theories."
We do not think that this could have been written before autumn 1930, when Gödel's incompleteness theorems [ 1931 ] became known. If this is so, then the typescript cannot have been written before autumn 1930, which excludes the first option of the previous subsection.
2. Moreover, there is the reference to [ Griss, 1951a; in Note 6, § 2.3.2. Unless the notes were added much later to our typescript than the typescript itself was originally written, this means that the typescript cannot have been written before 1951.
3. Furthermore, there is also the following reference (cf. Note 9, § 2.3.2):
"Dabei ist insbesondere der Umstand mitbestimmend, daß neuerdings die beweistheoretischen Untersuchungen in einen engeren Kontakt getreten sind mit den allgemeinen Theorien der abstrakten Algebra und Topologie, so daß die Aussicht sich eröffnet, daß die beweistheoretischen Methoden zu einem wirkungsvollen Hilfsmittel in diesen Gebieten sich entwickeln." "Here we have to consider in particular the crucial factor that the prooftheoretic investigations have come into a close contact with the general theories of abstract algebra and topology, opening up the prospect that the proof-theoretic methods may develop toward an effective tool in these areas."
We have no idea to which publication before [ Hasenjaeger, 1950c ] the contact with topology could refer.
If this is so, then also the second option of the previous subsection can be excluded and the typescript was probably written by Hasenjaeger during or after his stay with Bernays in Zürich.
3.2 § 2 of the Typescript (Hints : Hasenjaeger, 1950 : Hasenjaeger, -1977 The sentence of the typescript found in the second instead of the first edition of the "Grundlagen der Mathematik" (which we discussed in § 2.4.1) clearly speaks in favor of a version written during the preparation of the second edition; and the only work in this context we know about is joint work of Hasenjaeger and Bernays.
The sentence of the typescript improving on both editions of the "Grundlagen der Mathematik" (which we discussed in § 2.4.2) makes it likely that it was written with the intention of a thorough revision; and the only such attempt we know about is joint work of Hasenjaeger and Bernays. Moreover, as Bernays used to keep track very carefully of any correction in his author's copies (such as the one for the first edition owned by Erwin Engeler, cf. ), such an improvement over both editions strongly indicates that our typescript may be the result of a collaboration of Hasenjaeger and Bernays after the publication of the second edition of the first volume (1968), i.e. in the years from 1968 to 1977 (when Bernays died).
§ 3 of the Typescript (No Hints)
Although § 3 of the typescript is most interesting and we would be keen on reading the remainder of it if it were found, it ends too early for giving us a clear hint on the time of its writing.
Hasenjaeger and Bernays
As we have seen, for finding out the time of writing of our typescript, it may be helpful to find out more about Hasenjaeger's scholarship as Bernays' assistant in Zürich for the preparation of the second edition of the "Grundlagen der Mathematik" in the early 1950s. So the questions is: What do we know about the relation of Gisbert Hasenjaeger and Bernays around the year 1950 ?
Besides several biographical remarks from Hasenjaeger in [ Menzler-Trott, 2001 ] , there seem to be only three non-trivial biographical texts on Hasenjaeger: One is a laudation by Diller [ 2000 ] , the other two are on his time as a cryptologist responsible for the security of the German Enigma in the second world war [ Schmeh, 2009; 2013 ] . There we learn that he was born June 1, 1919, in Hildesheim (Germany) as a son of a lawyer, 12 that he was seriously wounded on Jan. 2, 1942, as a German soldier in Russia, and that Heinrich Scholz saved him from being ordered to the Russian front again, by recruiting him for the cryptology department of the High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) in Berlin.
Hasenjaeger and Bernays were exchanging letters on the first edition of "Grundlagen der Mathematik" since 1943, and from 1949 on also on Hasenjaeger's own work, published as [ Hasenjaeger, 1950a; 1950b; 1950c; 1952a; 1953a ] . They definitely met each other in autumn 1949 at the "Kolloquium zur Logistik und der mathematischen Grundlagenforschung, Oberwolfach (Germany), Sept. 27-Oct. 1, 1949". Indeed, the following photo shows Hasenjaeger in the back row to the right behind Bernays (with H. Arnold Schmidt in dark suit to the right of Bernays, and Kurt Schütte rightmost).
12
According to [Menzler-Trott, 2001, p.186] Scholz (1884 Scholz ( -1956 .
13
All in all, three scholarships were granted to Hasenjaeger by the ETH Board ("ETH-Rat", at that time called "Schweizerischer Schulrat") according to [ Hasenjaeger, 1951; , with the goal to assist Bernays in the preparation of the second edition of the "Grundlagen der Mathematik".
Hasenjaeger's first stay as Bernays' assistant in Zürich took place in winter term 1950/51, cf. [ Hasenjaeger, 1950e ] . As planned from the beginning, a second stay took place during summer term 1951.
Hasenjaeger, however, produced the first proper sketch for the overall layout for second edition of the "Grundlagen der Mathematik" in the form of a rough 1950 and 1951 ) that the work on the "Grundlagen der Mathematik" had not even started yet: "Inzwischen ist Herr Hasenjaeger hier erschienen, und ich habe ihn als allererstes gefragt nach dem Stande der Arbeit an dem Grundlagenbuch. Er hat mir gesagt, dass diese Arbeit noch gar nicht hat anlaufen können, weil Sie die Mengenlehre erst fertig machen müssen. Dies hat mich nun wirklich so erschreckt, dass ich es Ihnen mit der ersten Möglichkeit sagen muss." "In the meantime, Mr. Hasenjaeger appeared here, and my very first question was about the state of affairs of the work on the foundations book. He told me that this work could not even have started yet, because you first have to complete the set theory. Now this has alarmed me to such an extend that I have to this to you at the first opportunity."
The noun phrase "the set theory" refers to [ Bernays, 1954 ] (received March 30, 1953 , where Hasenjaeger is mentioned only in the form of a reference to [ Hasenjaeger, 1953a ] .
In the eyes of Scholz, it was even worse for Hasenjaeger's career that the work of Hasenjaeger and Bernays on the second edition did not even start before summer 1951, cf. [ Scholz, 1951c; .
The sketch attached to Hasenjaeger's letter [ 1951 ] to Bernays seems to be the elaborated protocol of the very first involved discussion with Bernays on the subject of the second edition of Hilbert-Bernays, which probably took place at the very end of the winter term 1950/51 in Zürich.
Most surprisingly, however, this sketch does not show the slightest similarity with our typescript here. As the non-matching of this sketch (handwritten by Hasenjaeger) with our typescript is crucial for the timing assessment of our typescript, let us quote the beginning of it:
See the item on [Hasenjaeger, 1950c] Moreover, this sketch attached to [ Hasenjaeger, 1951 ] shows that the goal was a complete rewriting of the book right from the beginning -not an integration of new parts into the first edition as found in our typescript. From the sequence of letters and postcards [ Hasenjaeger, 1952d ] , [ Bernays, 1952 ] , [ Hasenjaeger, 1952e ] , it becomes clear that the project of a complete reorganization of the book was still continued in 1952; in particular a completely new version of the treatment of the ι-operator is discussed in this sequence. Note that, according to the sketch attached to [ Hasenjaeger, 1951 ] , the ι was to be treated in Chapters VI and VII of all in all 12 chapters (incl. the unnumbered introduction and supplement chapters).
Therefore, Bernays gives a wrong impression by using the subjunctive "erfordert hätte" ("would have required") in the Preface to the Second Edition, cf. § 1.2.1. As a complete rewriting of the book was planned from the very beginning of the work, it cannot be the case that the work was given up when it became clear that a complete reorganization of the book was required. The truth seems to be that this work was given up only after a completely reorganized version for the first volume was already written (at least the chapter on the ι, which is the last one in the first volume of the first edition), and also after the writing our typescript (not at all following this draft) and at least the still missing continuation of its § 3.
To overcome the problem of zero publications under Hasenjaeger's name during his two semesters in Zürich, a further stay of Hasenjaeger as Bernays' assistant was strongly suggested by Scholz already Feb. 1, 1951 , in Scholz' letter [ 1951b to Hasenjaeger. This third stay indeed took place during winter term 1951/52 at the ETH Zurich, and Hasenjaeger left Zürich soon after Feb. 18, 1952 , cf. [ Hasenjaeger, 1952c .
Finally, as we were neither able to find a reasonable short CV of Gisbert Hasenjaeger in publications nor in the WWW, we have compiled the following one.
Conclusion
In spite of some minor evidence that our typescript was written before 1929 (cf. § 3.1.1(1)) or in the year 1931 (cf. § 3.1.1(2)), the overwhelming evidence says that it was written not before 1951 (as explicated in § § 3.1.2 and 3.2). After all, why should there be two carbon copies of our typescript in the legacy of Gisbert Hasenjaeger if he was not involved in the editing of this text?
What we still do not know, however, is the time of writing, and we cannot exclude any year from 1951 to 1968 (when the second edition of the first volume was published). Because of the improvements of our typescript over both editions of Hilbert-Bernays (cf. § 2.4.2, § 3.1.1(3)), even the years from 1968 to 1977 (when Bernays died) cannot be excluded. Most likely, however, is the time of the winter term 1951/52, the last one Hasenjaeger stayed with Bernays at the ETH in Zürich (as explicated in § 3.4).
In any case, the finding of this displaced typescript is essential in the context of Hilbert and Bernays' "Grundlagen der Mathematik", because it provides us with some new insights 14 into the finitist standpoint and its development, in particular in connection with the two editions of the first volume of the "Grundlagen der Mathematik" .
Three Most Interesting Scripts Still Missing
As we do not know any way to find the following three scripts with our limited resources, the treasure quest remains open for future prospectors:
1. It is worthwhile to invest further effort and to search the legacy of Bernays and the ETH archives more broadly: There may be a chance to find a displaced continuation of our typescript, at least the remainder of its § 3, possibly in form of a draft partly in Bernays' Gabelsberger shorthand. Such a finding may considerably change our point of view on Bernays' ideas on the foundations of mathematics.
2. Be aware that our typescript must not be mistaken for the other typescript that Hasenjaeger wrote according to his handwritten sketch attached to [ Hasenjaeger, 1951 ] -probably a typescript of a completely rewritten first volume of the "Grundlagen der Mathematik" (cf. § 3.4). Regarding the views of Bernays on the foundations of mathematics in the early 1950s, this other typescript would be a real bonanza. We have no idea on its whereabouts.
3. Finally, to find the script for the first edition remains a big dream of every historian of modern logic.
14 For instance, § 2 of the typescript has provided us with some new insight into the finitist standpoint, which helped us to improve the translation of the first part of § 2 of in considerably, cf. § 2.4.2. Moreover, § 3 of the typescript has provided us with some new insight into the finitist standpoint, which led to Note 349.2 in [Hilbert & Bernays, 2017c, p. 349] .
